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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to survey recent game theoretic 
models of research and development, and to ask whether they yield 
practical implications or testable hypotheses. Although individual 
models have unambiguous implications, the array of existing models 
still generates considerable controversy. This heightens the interest 
in and need for empirical tests of these theories. 
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The purpose of this paper is to survey recent game theoretic models of 
research and development, and to ask whether they yield practical implications 
or testable hypotheses, The papers I will be discussing have been written or 
published within the past five years; they have a good deal in common, relying 
upon similar assumptions and building upon each other. Because of this, the 
literature surveyed here may seem narrow, and some relevant work has probably 
been inadvertently omitted, I apologize for these omissions. For want of 
space, I will not discuss the nonnative conclusions of this literature, 1 
I. Why Game Theory? 
As students of industrial organization, we cannot ignore interactions 
among the agents we study, Positive industrial organization is the study of 
business policy and strategy, Modern noncooperative game theory is a language 
of strategy and equilibrium; that is, it provides an equilibrium framework in 
which to examine individuals' strategic behavior. Recent advances, for 
instance the theory of supergames (Friedman 1971) and the notions of perfect 
equilibrium (Selten 1975) and sequential rationality (Kreps and Wilson 1982), 
have made game theory an even more powerful tool for examining controversial 
issues in industrial organization. All models must postulate the behavior of 
some agents in the model; a game theoretic model must, in addition, impose 
certain consistency checks, or equilibrium conditions, upon this postulated 
behavior. Within the confines of the game theoretic paradigm, there are still 
many alternative modeling choices regarding, for example, informational 
assumptions apd timing conventions. Thus the paradigm is capable of 
generating a wide range of equilibrium behavior, As with any theory, the 
ultimate appeal for validation or vitiation is to empirical testing, I will 
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isolate and discuss several implications, most of them controversial, fran the 
recent literature. This seems to be a useful first step toward the goal of 
empirical testing.2 
II. The Implications of Recent Models 
Because most of the papers discussed belCM analyse and extend a single 
basic model, I provide a brief description of this model. Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980) and Loury (1979) employ a model of stochastic invention in 
which the probability of success by firm i by a given time, t, is an 
exponential function. That is, if ti represents firm i's (random) success 
-h.t 
date, then Pr(ti � t) = 1 - e 1 , where hi is the "hazard rate," or 
conditional probability density of success, given no success to date. The 
choice variable for each firm i is a lump-sum expenditure xi at time t = O, 
which implies a hazard rate of hi= h(xi). With this specification, the 
expected time till success for firm i is the reciprocal of the hazard rate; 
E(ti) = 1/h(xi)' The innovation "production function" h(x) is allCMed to have 
initial increasing returns to scale, but eventually decreasing returns set in. 
Patent protection is assumed perfect, firms are identical, and no further 
innovation is anticipated, This problem is modeled as a simultaneous-move 
game, and the equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium in investment 
strategies. Lee and Wilde (1980) modified this formulation by assuming that 
the investment is a � cost, rather than a lump-sum payment at the initial 
date. That is, firm i pays at the rate xi' but only until someone succeeds, 
They maintain all of the remaining assumptions of the model, The first three 
implications turn on this difference in the specification of costs. 
1. The amount invested by an individual firm decreases with the 
number of firms engaging in R and D; hCMever, aggregate industry investment 
increases with the number of firms. 
1'. The� of investment by an individual firm increases with the 
number of firms engaging in R and D; a fortiori, the aggregate industry 
investment rate increases with the number of firms, 
Using the Dasgupta and Stiglitz and Loury fixed cost model, one can 
conclude that the equilibrium amount invested by any one firm decreases with 
the number of firms engaged in research and development. Despite this, an 
increase in the number of firms engaged in R and D results in an increase in 
aggregate investment. Fran the Lee and Wilde flCM cost model, one can deduce 
that the equilibrium rate of expenditure per firm increases with an increase 
in the number of firms; a fortiori, aggregate investment increases with the 
number of firms. The intuition behind these conclusions is simple. In the 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz and Loury model, an increase in the number of firms 
reduces the expected benefit to investment (a particular firm is less likely 
to win), leaving expected costs unchanged, The firm responds by reducing 
investment. In the Lee and Wilde model, both expected benefits and expected 
costs are reduced by the addition of another firm (since the flCM investment 
will be made for a stochastically shorter period of time), and the net effect 
is to enhance incentives to invest. Implications 1 and 1' are not inherently 
contradictory; it is quite possible that although the flCM rate of investment 
increases, expected discounted flCM costs decrease with an increase in the 
number of firms. What � contradictory are these models' respective 
implications regarding the effect of an increase in the number of firms upon 
the expected time until success for an individual firm. Since in both cases, 
E(ti) = 1/h(xi)' we see that the fixed cost model implies that E(ti) increases 
with the·number of firms, while the flCM cost model implies that E(t.) l 
decreases with the number of firms. 
When one relaxes the assumption of perfect patent protection, it is 
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easy to construct examples in which an increase in the number of finns 
decreases the individual rate of investment in a flow cost model; this is 
because if imitation is a sufficiently attractive alternative, the finn is 
less concerned about being first (Reinganum 1982a), In fact, when imitation 
is sufficiently swift and complete, there may be an inverse relationship 
between aggregate investment and the number of finns in the industry (Futia 
1980). An alternative fonn of nonappropriability occurs when rival finns 
experience significant positive spillovers from each others' research and 
development expenditures, If these spillovers are sufficiently large, then 
aggregate investment is inversely related to the number of finns in the 
industry (Spence 1982). Thus both the degree of appropriability and the 
number of finns have direct effects on investment; in addition, there are 
interaction effects between the degree of appropriability and the number of 
finns. Since the number of finns engaging in R and D is also endogenous, any 
test of these hypotheses requires a simultaneous equations approach, 
2, In a Nash equilibrium with unrestricted entry, there will be 
excess capacity in the R and D technology, 
2 1• In a Nash equilibrium with unrestricted entry, there will be no 
excess capacity in the R and D technology, 
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In the lump-sum expenditure model of Loury and Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 
it can be shown that with unrestricted entry, in equilibrium finns will 
operate their R and D projects in a region of increasing returns to scale. In 
the flow cost model of Lee and Wilde, this result is reversed; finns will 
always operate in the decreasing returns portion of the innovation production 
function, 
3, At equilibrium, an increase in aggregate rival investment results 
in a decrease in investment by a single finn. 
31, At equilibrium, an increase in the aggregate rival investment 
rate results in an increase in the rate of investment by a single firm. 
In the fixed cost models, the profit-maximizing investment is smaller 
the greater is aggregate rival investment, while in the flow cost models, the 
profit-maximizing rate of investment is greater the greater is the aggregate 
rival investment rate. Alternatively put, in the fixed cost models, best 
response functions are decreasing at equilibrium, while in the flow cost 
models, they are increasing, 
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These models all focused upon symmetric equilibria in which no 
previous innovation was assumed and no future innovation is anticipated. Any 
stochastic theory of industry evolution will give rise to asymmetric initial 
conditions; moreover, Flaherty (1980) has demonstrated the manner in which 
industries whose members are initially identical may end up following 
divergent paths even when industry evolution is completely deterministic, In 
view of these theoreticai considerations as well as the obvious empirical fact 
of asymmetry, it is important to develop asymmetric models of innovation if we 
wish to apply them to real industries. The models discussed below add such an 
asymmetry, either through an inherited asymmetric market structure, or through 
the assumption of a leader/follower, rather than simultaneous-move, framework. 
The next few implications deal with the impact of current monopoly power and 
anticipated future innovation upon incentives to invest in R and D when firms 
invest simultaneously. 
4. There is an inverse relationship between the magnitude of an 
innovation and the likelihood that it is invented by a current industry 
leader. 
5. Investment in R and D is lower for a large incumbent firm and 
challengers alike the greater is the flow of current revenue to the incumbent 
finn. 
6. The rate of individual finn investment on a particular innovation 
declines with the number of anticipated subsequent innovations. 
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These results follow from the model of a sequence of innovations 
developed in Reinganum (forthcoming). An innovation is termed drastic if the 
innovator captures a sufficiently large share of the post-innovation market; 
that is, if the innovation substantially replaces whatever product or process 
was previously used. When finns anticipate a sequence of drastic innovations, 
the current industry leader, or incumbent, invests less than each challenger 
and will thus succeed itself as incumbent (on average) less than 1/n per cent 
of the time, where n is the number of finns. The intuition behind this result 
is straightforward. When invention is uncertain, a finn making higher profits 
today gains relatively less from invention than a firm with lower current 
profits; consequently, an industry leader invests less than a challenger or 
potential entrant. A simple extension of this model indicates that for 
innovations which are minor (i. e. , for which the innovator captures a 
sufficiently small fraction of the market), the incumbent will invest more 
than a challenger, Thus we would expect an inverse relationship between the 
magnitude of the innovation and the likelihood that it is developed by a 
current industry leader. Moreover, this implication is robust to changes in 
the specification of costs; that is, this result is insensitive to the fixed 
versus flow cost assumption. Using a single-innovation fixed cost model with 
one incumbent monopolist and one challenger, Freeman (1982) found that for 
large innovations a single challenger will invest more on R and D than an 
incumbent monopolist; von Ungern-Sternberg (1980) found that for small 
innovations an incumbent monopolist will invest more than a challenger, and 
that the probability that the monopolist will succeed first is decreasing with 
the magnitude of 'the innovation. 
The second implication above is a pure equilibriun effect. An 
increase· in flow revenues to the incumbent has no direct effect upon the 
challenger's payoff; however, it does induce the incumbent to invest at a 
lower rate. Because Reinganum (forthcoming) employs a flow cost 
specification, best response functions are increasing; consequently, the 
equilibriun response of challengers is to reduce their investment as well. 
Finally, implication 6 is a consequence of two effects; a sequence of 
anticipated future innovations reduces the value of being the incumbent 
(because no finn can expect a long tenure as incumbent when many innovations 
remain), and increases the value of being a challenger (because one has many 
remaining opportunities to succeed). These two effects combine to reduce 
current investment in R and D. 
The following implications discuss the impact of changing the timing 
of the game; suppose that there is a leader/follower structure (in which the 
incumbent monopolist moves first) rather than a simultaneous-move structure. 
7, If the innovation production process is non-stochastic, then a 
finn which currently dominates an industry will persist as a monopolist, 
because it will pre-emptively patent innovations before potential entrants. 
8. The above argument holds only if the industry is one in which the 
threat of anti-trust intervention precludes ex post negotiation and exclusive 
licensing. If ex post licensing is permitted, the most efficient firm would 
patent the innovation, but this need not be the incumbent. 
The model which generates the first of these implications appears in 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and is more fully developed in Gilbert and 
Newbery (1982), Gilbert and Newbery describe a bidding model of R and D in 
which invention is deterministic; thus the question of who invents is 
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essentially one of who has the most to gain from doing so, An entrant will be 
willing to bid post-innovation duopoly profits for the innovation, By 
permitting entry, the incumbent and the entrant receive post-innovation 
duopoly profits; by preemptively patenting the innovation, the incumbent 
receives post-innovation monopoly profits. Since the present value of 
monopoly profits exceeds the sum of duopoly profits, the monopolist will bid 
more for the innovation (i. e. , patent it before the entrant). The 
qualification is voiced by Salant (1983)1 who argued that if an entrant 
anticipates the possibility of innovating and subsequently selling out to the 
current incumbent, then it will not evaluate the gains from inventing as 
merely its share of duopoly profits, but will include the expected gains from 
licensing its patent to the incumbent. In this case, the most efficient firm 
-- not necessarily the incumbent -- would patent the innovation. 
9, Licensing encourages research when production costs are relatively 
similar, and discourages research when production costs are relatively 
disparate, 
In a two-firm model of research and development with licensing, 
Gallini and Winter (1983) discuss two incentives to license, The first of 
these, termed the ex post incentive, is the one identified by Salant -- the 
incentive to reduce production inefficiencies and monopolize the output 
market, There is also an ex ante incentive to license (origininally 
identified by Gallini (1983)), which reflects the gain from eliminating 
wasteful research expenditures as well as the threat of a potentially 1G1-cost 
competitor. By licensing its technology to a potential challenger at a 
sufficiently lGI royalty rate, an incumbent firm can make R and D a less 
attractive prospect to the challenger; this simultaneously reduces 
expenditures on R and D, and removes the threat that the challenger may 
discover a very 1G1-cost technology, Thus a large ex post incentive makes 
research attractive, while a large ex ante incentive reduces the return to 
research, When production costs are sufficiently similar, ex ante incentives 
are too weak to dominate the gains from R and D generated by ex post 
incentives, and investment is encouraged. When production costs are 
sufficiently dissimilar, ex ante incentives dominate, and investment is 
discouraged. Empirical testing again would require a simultaneous equations 
approach in which investment in research and development and some measure of 
licensing behavior are to be explained. 
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10. Over the course of developing an innovation, the configuration of 
firms engaging in R and D will become more concentrated as some firms fall 
sufficiently far behind and, consequently, drop out, 
Equilibrium behavior in the models of Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz and 
Tirole (1983) and Harris and Vickers (1983) is characterized by this pattern. 
There is an initial burst of investment in which several firms participate; 
hG1ever, when rival firms fall sufficiently far behind the leader, they prefer 
to drop out of the competition. Consequently, the leader completes the 
innovation at its preferred, more leisurely, pace, Although extremely 
stylized, these models incorporate learning and experience in a way not found 
in previous work. 
III. Conclusions 
Although individual models have unambiguous implications, the array of 
existing models still generates considerable controversy, This heightens the 
interest in and need for empirical tests of these theories. Unfortunately, 
these implications are generated by highly simplified models, which may make 
empirical testing more difficult, For instance, some very real aspects of 
industrial competition are left out, including the possibility of incumbent 
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advantages (e. g. , better access to capital markets, internal financing, 
economies of scope) and disadvantages (e. g. , bureaucratic red tape, weak 
employee incentives due to a tenuous connection between performance and 
reward), Also left out are the possible effects of conglomerate 
diversification; all of these models compare expenditures in a single research 
area, rather than in the sort of diversified portfolio of projects which might 
be common among large firms. 
Although some sources of data which are suitable for testing these 
hypotheses do exist, much of the existing data is too aggregated. In 
addition, many of these hypotheses rely on data which may be difficult to 
obtain, such as infonnation about the research programs of unsuccessful firms. 
In order to move in the direction of empirical testing, we must both extend 
these models in more realistic directions to accomodate existing data, and 
attempt to gather the specific data required to test directly such models of 
firm behavior. 
* 
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1. For a more complete survey of the previous empirical and theoretical 
literature on this subject, see Kamien and Schwartz (1982), For a 
detailed account of previous empirical work and a discussion of 
appropriate measurement and methodology, see Grether (1974). 
2. Although previous empirical work is suggestive, most of it has not been 
carried out with a specific behavioral model of the firm in mind. 
Moreover, it has tested hypotheses which were couched in much more 
aggregated terms than those to be discussed belCM, 
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